

## 13<sup>th</sup> AC&WG History

Pursuant to authority, Headquarters Far East Air Forces, the 13<sup>th</sup> Aircraft Control and Warning Group (Provisional), is formed at Leyte Island, Philippine Islands, on 20 July, 1945 with a provisional manning strength of one hundred eighty nine (189) Officers, five (5) warrant officers and one thousand eight hundred sixty (1,860) enlisted men.

This provisional Group is assigned to the XIII Fighter Command and is placed under the operational control of Headquarters Thirteenth Air Force.

Experience in the European Theater of Operations has clearly indicated the desirability of integrating into a single organization all aircraft warning, fighter control and tactical control elements required for the support of a field army. The Aircraft Control and Warning Group was evolved to fill this need. The function of an aircraft control and warning group is to provide all aircraft warning, fighter control, and close support control facilities required for the close support and air defense of one field army deployed along a front not to exceed 100 miles in width or depth. (13<sup>th</sup> AC&WG History)

First Unit Commander: Lt. Col. Henry C. Byrd U.S. Army Signal Corps.

1945 Subordinate Units: 13<sup>th</sup> TCC

131<sup>st</sup> AC&WS, Light Mobile (Provisional)

132<sup>nd</sup> AC&WS, Heavy (P)

133<sup>rd</sup> AC&WS, Mobile (P)

134<sup>th</sup> AC&WS, Light Mobile (P)

135<sup>th</sup> Tactical Control Squadron (P)

319<sup>th</sup> Fighter Control Squadron

557<sup>th</sup> Signal Air Warning Battalion

597<sup>th</sup> Signal Air Warning Battalion

July 1945: 13<sup>th</sup> TCC (Tactical Control Center) and the TAC (Tactical Air Command) command post will generally be located together and in the immediate vicinity of Army Headquarters. Although desirable, it will usually not be practicable to site the AN/CPS-1 in this same location. The AN/CPS-1 will ordinarily be set up in a separate location within 30 to 40 miles of the front lines. (13<sup>th</sup> AC&WG History)



This photo was taken during a briefing by Japanese officers in their Air Defense Control Center in the Imperial Palace Grounds, Tokyo, Japan, within two days of VJ Day. Lt. Col Henry C. Byrd (Commander 13th AC&WG) is second from the right, hands on hip. Japanese officer with pointer is interpreter Captain Shimizu, Japanese Army. Next to him is Col. Garland (arms folded). Seated on the table is Major Bates, Executive Officer (13th AC&WG). Next to Major Bates is Lt. Col. Sasao, Chief of Staff for the air defense of Tokyo. (Information and photo courtesy of Lt. Col Byrd).

## Wilmington Expert Discloses Jap Rescue Setup Ineffective

By DUANE HENNESSY

TOKYO, Oct. 12.- (AP) —Japan's radar defense was so ineffective that it could not tell whether approaching planes were its own or American, Fifth Air Force experts reported today after inspecting the Tokyo fighter control center.

Neither could the radar indicate the height or number of planes. Americans watched Japanese headed by Col. H. Saso, staff officer in charge of the center, give a demonstration of battle conditions. The information was funnelled to the center from 1,600 observation posts and radar stations in the Tokyo area. Garland said that was several times too many.

"After Iwo Jima fell, plane warnings first came from naval radar stations on Chichi Jima and, Haha Jima," Saso said "That usually was about four hours before your planes reached the (Honshu) coast. They were very meager, reporting merely that enemy planes were headed in the general direction of the Japanese homeland. Japanese radar could not tell the number, height or direction with any degree of accuracy."

Once the planes crossed the Japanese coast, they broke a photo-electric line that stretched along a good portion of the Japanese homeland. Once planes had been spotted by ground observers in the Tokyo area, they dropped completely from the radar board.

"What kind of a rescue system did you have for pilots shot down at sea?" asked Lt. Col. Henry C. Byrd, Jr., Wilmington, N. C., radar expert.

"At first we asked the navy to pick up our pilots," Saso said. Then spreading his hands in a helpless gesture, he added "—later on, there was no navy."